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Abstract 
We review the main changes in the interbank market after the financial crisis started in August 
2007. In particular, we focus on the fixed income market and we analyse the most relevant 
empirical evidences regarding the divergence of the existing basis between interbank rates with 
different tenor, such as Libor and OIS. We also discuss a qualitative explanation of these effects 
based on the consideration of credit and liquidity variables. Then, we focus our attention on the 
diffusion of collateral agreements among OTC derivatives market counterparties, and on the 
consequent change of paradigm for pricing derivatives. We illustrate the main qualitative features 
of the new market practice, called CSA discounting, and we point out the most relevant issues for 
market players associated to its adoption. 
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1. Introduction 
The financial crisis begun in the second half of 2007 has triggered, among many consequences, a 
deep evolution phase of the classical framework adopted for trading derivatives. In particular, credit 
and liquidity risks were found to have macroscopical impacts on the prices of financial instruments, 
both plain vanillas and exotics. The market has learnt the lesson and persistently shows such 
effects. These are clearly visible in the market quotes of plain vanilla interest rate instruments, 
such as Deposits, Forward Rate Agreements (FRA), Swaps (IRS) and options (European Caps, 
Floors and Swaptions). Since August 2007, the primary interest rates of the interbank market, e.g. 
Libor, Euribor, Eonia, and Federal Funds rate1, display large basis spreads that have raised up to 
200 basis points. Similar divergences are also found between FRA rates and the forward rates 
implied by two consecutive Deposits, and similarly, among Swap rates with different floating leg 
tenors (Basis Swaps).  
After the financial crisis, the standard no-arbitrage framework adopted to price derivatives, 
developed over forty years following the Copernican Revolution of Black and Scholes (1973) and 
Merton (1973), became obsolete. Familiar relations described on standard textbooks (see e.g. 
Brigo and Mercurio 2006, Andersen and Piterbarg 2012, Hull 2008), such as the basic definition of 
forward interest rates, or the swap pricing formula, had to be abandoned. Also the fundamental 
idea of the construction of a single risk free yield curve, reflecting at the same time the present cost 
of funding of future cash flows and the level of forward rates, has been ruled out. The financial 
community has thus been forced to start the development of a new theoretical framework, 
including a larger set of relevant risk factors, and to review from scratch the no-arbitrage models 
used on the market for derivatives’ pricing and risk analysis. A relevant feature of the post-crisis 
market is given by the consideration of collateral agreements in the pricing framework of OTC 
trades. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we report the main changes and market evidences 
that characterize the most relevant interest rates of the interbank market since the explosion of the 
financial crisis. In particular, we focus on the EUR market and we analyze the relation between 
Euribor and Eonia market rates with different tenors, as observed in market quotations of Deposits, 
FRA, Swaps, Basis Swaps and Overnight Indexed Swaps (OIS). We argue that the financial crisis 
has sparked market liquidity and credit risk perception, that has been promptly reflected in the 
interest rates dynamics through increased and differentiated risk premia. We present a qualitative 
analysis of the Euribor – Eonia basis where we highlight the impacts of the credit and liquidity risk 
factor by introducing synthetic proxies that gauge the evolution of these two components during the 
period Jan. 2007 – Dec. 2011. In Section 3 we introduce the collateralization mechanics and the 
corresponding pricing methodology, called CSA discounting, that has been adopted by financial 
institutions to price collateralized trades, showing the consequences on market quotations of plain 
vanilla European Caps, Floors and Swaptions. Finally, we discuss the most relevant market issues 
regarding collateral management and pricing approach banks has to deal with while they fine tune 
their market practice and architecture to the evolved market framework. Conclusions are drawn in 
section 4. 
 
2. The Interbank Market After the Financial Crisis 
In this section we discuss the most relevant market data showing the main consequences of the 
financial crisis that started in August 2007. In particular, we focus our attention on Euribor and 
                                               
1
 Libor, sponsored by the British Banking Association (BBA), is quoted in all the major currencies and is the reference 
rate for international Over-The-Counter (OTC) transactions (see www.bbalibor.com). Euribor and Eonia, sponsored by 
the European Banking Federation (EBF), are the reference rates for OTC transactions in the Euro market (see 
www.euribor.org). The Federal Funds rate is a primary rate of the USD market and is set by the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) accordingly to the monetary policy decisions of the Federal Reserve (FED) (see 
http://www.federalreserve.gov). 
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Eonia market rates, as observed in market quotations of standard plain vanilla interest rate linear 
instruments, such as Deposits, FRA, Swaps, Basis Swaps and OIS2. We analyse the basis spread 
among Euribor and Eonia rate with different tenors, which affects, directly or implicitly, comparable 
market quotations of Deposits, FRAs, Swaps, Basis Swaps and OIS. Similar results hold for other 
currencies, e.g. USD Libor and Federal Funds rates (see. e.g. Mercurio 2009, 2010). 
Moreover, we report some market evidences trying to assess, in a qualitative way, the connections 
between credit and liquidity risk factors and the interbank market rates dynamics. To this aim, we 
consider quoted CDS spreads related to primary financial institutions of the EUR market and the 
volumes of the European Central Bank’s monetary policy operations and balance sheet items 
during the crisis. 
 
2.1. Euribor – Eonia Basis 
One of the most relevant impacts of the financial turmoil over the interest rate market dynamics is 
the explosion of the basis between Euribor and Eonia rates. Before August 2007 these two rates 
displayed strictly overlapping trends, differing by no more than 6 basis points (bps). In August 2007 
there has been a sudden increase of the Euribor rate and a simultaneous decrease of the OIS rate, 
that lead to the explosion of the corresponding basis spread.  
The reason of the abrupt divergence of the Euribor-Eonia basis can be explained by considering 
both the impact of the crisis on the credit and liquidity risk perception of the market and the 
monetary policy decisions adopted by international authorities in response to the financial turmoil, 
coupled with the different financial meaning and dynamics of these rates. 
 The Euribor rate is the reference rate for over-the-counter (OTC) transactions in the Euro 
area. It is defined as “the rate at which Euro interbank Deposits are being offered within the 
EMU zone by one prime bank to another at 11:00 a.m. Brussels time". The rate fixings for a 
strip of 15 maturities, ranging from one day to one year, are constructed as the trimmed 
average of the individual fixings (excluding the highest and lowest 15% tails) submitted by a 
panel of banks. The Contribution Panel is composed, as of September 2010, by 42 banks, 
selected among the EU banks with the highest business volume and credit standing in the 
Euro zone money markets, plus some large international bank from non-EU countries with 
important euro zone operations. Thus, Euribor rates reflect the average cost of funding of 
EU banks in the EUR interbank market at each given maturity. 
 The Eonia rate is the reference rate for overnight OTC transactions in the Euro area. It is 
constructed as the average rate of the overnight transactions (one day maturity deposits) 
executed during a given business day by a panel of banks on the interbank money market, 
weighted by the corresponding transaction volumes. The Eonia Contribution Panel 
coincides with the Euribor Contribution Panel. Thus, Eonia rate includes information on the 
short term (overnight) liquidity expectations of banks in the Euro money market. It is also 
used by the European Central Bank (ECB) as a method of effecting and observing the 
transmission of its monetary policy actions. Furthermore, the daily tenor of the Eonia rate 
makes negligible the credit and liquidity risks reflected on it: for this reason the OIS rates 
are considered the best proxies available in the market for the risk-free rate.  
 
                                               
2
 The Overnight Index Swap (OIS) is a swap with a fixed leg versus a floating leg indexed to the overnight rate (daily 
compounded over the coupon period). The Euro market quotes a standard OIS strip indexed to Eonia up to 30 years 
maturity. OISs with maturity up to 1 year settle a single coupon. 
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Figure 1: historical series of Euribor Deposit 6M rate versus Eonia OIS 6M rate. The 
corresponding spread is shown on the right scale (Jan. 2007 – Dec. 2011 window, source: 
Bloomberg). 
 
 
Figure 2: historical series of the Deposit Lending Facility rate, of the Marginal Lending Facility rate 
and of the Eonia rate (Jan. 2007 – Dec. 2011 window, sources: European Central Bank  and 
Bloomberg). 
 
M. Bianchetti, M. Carlicchi Markets Evolution After The Credit Crunch 
 
 
Page 6 of 35 
Figure 1 reports the historical series of the Euribor Deposit 6 month (6M) rate versus the Eonia OIS 
6 month (6M) rate over the time interval Jan. 2007 – Dec. 2011. During the crisis the solvency and 
solidity of the whole financial sector was brought into question and the credit and liquidity risk and 
premia associated to interbank transactions sharply increased. The Euribor rate dynamics 
immediately reflected these risk factors and raise to its highest levels over more than 10 years. As 
seen in Figure 1, the Euribor 6M rate suddenly increased on August 2007 and reached 5.49% on 
10 October 2008, the maximum since its introduction in the 1999. 
The historical trend of the Euribor – Eonia basis of Figure 1 can be divided in four distinct periods 
that are both related to different evolution phases of the financial turmoil. 
The first covers the pre-crisis period that ends in August 2007, where both the credit and liquidity 
risk premia associated to interbank market participants were negligible and Euribor rates 
maintained levels close to the Eonia OIS ones. 
The second covers the time interval from August 2007 to March 2009. During this period the 
interbank market was characterized by a simultaneous reduction of the OIS rate and an increase of 
the Euribor Deposit rate that lead to the explosion of the corresponding basis spread. The latter 
touches the peak of 222 bps in October 2008, when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy 
protection and central banks decide to ease their policy cutting official rates. 
The third period covers from March 2009 up to mid-2010 and it includes the phase of stabilization 
and reduction of the Euribor – Eonia basis, which maintained a level between 40 bps and 60 bps. 
After the failure of Lehman Brothers, central banks tried to fix markets’ distress through the 
adoption of special policy measures that provided financial institutions with considerable amounts 
of liquidity, trying to ease the credit shortage and restore confidence within the interbank market. 
The last period covers from the second half of 2010 to the end of 2011 and it is related to the 
sovereign crisis generated by some Euro zone state members. Financial markets were 
characterized by a strong sentiment of uncertainty related to the possible consequences that the 
failure of some European state could have in the Euro financial system. As we can observe from 
Figure 1, during this period the dynamics of the Euribor – Eonia basis is mainly driven by the 
decrease of the Eonia rate. Indeed, the Eonia OIS 6M market quote has experienced a sudden 
decrease of almost 90 bps between August and December 2011, while the Euribor Deposit 6M has 
displayed a reduction of just 20 bps during the same period. The decrease of the Eonia OIS rates 
was mainly a consequence of the intervention of the ECB that injected liquidity in the market 
allowing banks to fund themselves at lower rates than the ones of the interbank market. 
The peculiar dynamics of the Euribor – Eonia basis can be ascribed to credit and liquidity risk 
factors reflected on unsecured money market rates. The increase of August 2007 experienced by 
the Euribor rates can be explained with an higher liquidity and credit risk premium required by the 
market over lending transactions with European interbank market participants. In section 2.4 we 
report some market evidences regarding the influence of the credit and liquidity risk factors within 
the new market’s framework. In particular, we try to connect the explosion and movements of the 
Euribor – Eonia basis with two market proxies that, in our opinion, could help us to identify periods 
of credit and liquidity stress within the European interbank market. 
Regarding the monetary policy effects, the intervention of central banks during the turmoil was 
finalized to restablishing and preserving an appropriate liquidity level in the interbank market. The 
most effective and common monetary policy instruments are referred to the “interest rate channel” 
set by central banks and tend to affect the short term money market rates like the Eonia rate, 
whose fixing is strictly connected with the two main ECB’s standing facilities rates: 
 The Deposit Facility rate: it is the official interest rate that the ECB offers to all the market 
eligible counterparties over overnight deposits. The Deposit Facility constitutes a liquidity 
absorption monetary policy instrument. 
 The Marginal Lending Facility rate: it is the official interest rate that the ECB applies over 
overnight lending transaction with all the market eligible counterparties. The Marginal 
Lending Facility constitutes a liquidity providing monetary policy instrument. 
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The two standing facilities have the objective of steering the level of interbank overnight and short 
term rates and they defined the so-called “Rates Corridor”. The Marginal Lending Facility rate is 
normally substantially higher than the corresponding money market rate and the Deposit Facility 
rate is usually substantially lower than the money market rate. Thus, financial institutions recur to 
the standing facilities in absence of any others convenient alternatives within the interbank market. 
Since there is no limit to the access of these standing facility, the Deposit Facility rate and the 
Marginal Facility rate define the overnight interest rate corridor that set a ceiling and a floor for the 
value of the Eonia rate. This is clear from Figure 2, showing that, over the period Jan. 2007 – Dec. 
2011, Eonia is always higher than the Deposit Facility rate and lower than the Marginal Lending 
Facility rate. We notice that, since 2009, the Eonia rate is closer to the ECB Deposit Facility rate. 
This point will be explained in section 2.4, in connection with Figure 12. 
Besides the conventional monetary policy instruments, the ECB introduced temporary monetary 
facilities such as fixed-rate refinancing operations with full-allotment, extension of the securities 
accepted as collateral and Long Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) in order to ease the 
liquidity access among financial institutions. Monetary policy decisions affect also long term 
interest rates since they reflect expectations of the future evolution of short term interest rates. 
However, the impact of monetary policy decisions is less direct than those experienced by the 
Eonia rate and should be considered in terms of future growth expectations. 
The Euribor – Eonia basis explosion plotted in Figure 1 is essentially a consequence of the 
different credit and liquidity risk reflected by Euribor and Eonia rates. We stress that such 
divergence is not a consequence of the counterparty risk carried by the financial contracts, 
Deposits and OISs, exchanged in the interbank market by risky counterparties, but depends on the 
different fixing levels of the underlying Euribor and Eonia rates. Clearly the market has learnt the 
lesson of the crisis and has not forgotten that these interest rates are driven by different credit and 
liquidity dynamics. From an historical point of view, we can compare this effect to the appearance 
of the volatility smile on the option markets after the 1987 crash (see e.g. Derman and Kani 1994). 
It is still there. 
 
2.2. FRA Rates versus Forward Rates 
The above considerations, referred to spot rates, related to Deposit and OIS contracts, apply to 
forward rates as well, related to Forward Rate Agreement (FRA) contracts. In Figure 4 we show 
the historical series of quoted Euribor FRA 6Mx12M rates versus the quoted Eonia FRA 6Mx12M 
rates, versus the Euribor forward rate 6Mx12M implied by the two quoted Deposits on Euribor 6M 
and Euribor 12M.  
The Euribor FRA 6Mx12M rate is the equilibrium (fair) rate of a FRA contract starting at spot date 
(today + 2 working days in the Euro market), maturing in 12 months, with a floating leg indexed to 
the Euribor 6M rate, versus a fixed interest rate leg. At maturity, the floating leg pays the interest 
accrued with the Euribor 6M rate fixed 6 months before, over the time interval [6M, 12M]. The fixed 
leg pays the interest accrued with the fixed rate, over the same time interval. Thus the FRA 
equilibrium rate reflects the market expectations over the future fixing of the underlying Euribor 
6Mx12M rate. 
The Eonia FRA is similar to the Euribor FRA, but the floating leg is indexed to Eonia, daily fixed 
and compounded over the time interval [6M, 12M]. 
The Euribor forward rate             , referred to the generic time interval          , is obtained 
through the standard formula (see e.g. Hull 2008), 
                     
         
       
   
 
          
  
(1) 
where         is the price in   of a zero-coupon bond maturing in    and            represents the 
year fraction between      and   . Equation 1 implicitly assumes that discounting from    to   at the 
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spot rate         is equivalent to discounting from    to      at the corresponding forward rate 
             and then discounting from      to   at the spot rate        . 
Using equation 1, we compute the Euribor and Eonia forward rates as follows 
 
    
                     
 
 
    
                        
 
 
    
                 
  
(2) 
 
    
                    
 
 
    
                        
 
 
    
                
  
(3) 
where   
           is the market rate quoted at time   for an Euribor Deposit with maturity    with 
tenor  ,   
               is the market rate quoted at time   for an Euribor FRA contract covering 
the period           with tenor  ,   
          is the Eonia OIS market rate quoted at time   with 
maturity   ,   
               is the market rate quoted at time   for a Eonia FRA contract covering 
the interval           and the subscript   refers to the discount curve. In Figure 3 we depict the 
mechanism associated with the two equations 2 and 3 above. 
 
   
Figure 3: the two figures describe the mechanism we implemented in order to replicate the FRA 
market quotes. 
 
In Table 1 we report a snapshot of the numbers obtained on 30 December 2011  
Looking at the historical evolution in Figure 4, we observe that the three rates were essentially the 
same rate before the crisis, and diverged in August 2007, when the Forward, the Euribor FRA and 
the Eonia FRA acquired a positive basis with each other. The basis reached its maximum in 
October 2008, in correspondence of the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy.  
That difference can be justified by considering the nature of these rates. In particular, the credit an 
liquidity risk factors of FRA market equilibrium rates are mitigated by collateralization agreements 
that characterize FRA quoted contracts, while, in contrast, the deposit rates considered in the 
replication approach (i.e. Euribor Deposit 6M and Euribor Deposit 12M) are referred to unsecured 
transactions with different tenors (i.e. 6M and 12M) that, after the start of the crisis, reflect different 
liquidity and credit risk premia according to their maturity (Morini 2009). 
Regarding the Eonia interest rate market, we compute the historical series of the Eonia Forward 
6Mx12M rate during the interval Jan. 2007 – Dec. 2011 according to the equation 3 and we 
reported the results in Figure 5. We notice that the difference between the Eonia FRA 6Mx12M 
market rates and the corresponding forward rate is negligible over the whole observation period 
(average difference of 0.7 bps in absolute terms).  
The Eonia OIS rates used for the FRA replica are obtained through the compounding of the Eonia 
O/N rate. Hence, the credit and liquidity risk components carried by the Eonia Forward rates can 
be considered negligible and consistent with the risk premia reflected by the Eonia FRA market 
rates. 
In section 2.5 we report some findings of Mercurio (2009) who has proven that the above effects 
may be explained within a simple credit model that considers a default-free zero coupon bond and 
a risky zero coupon bond emitted by a defaultable counterparty. 
 
t 1T 2T
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Eonia FRA Replication (30
 
 Dec. 2011) 
Eonia OIS 
Maturity 
Eonia OIS Quote 
(%) 
Eonia FRA 
Start/End Dates 
Eonia FRA Quote 
(%) 
Eonia FRA 
Replica (%) 
Difference Replica-
Quote (bps) 
1M 0.396 1Mx2M 0.392 0.392 0.0 
2M 0.394 2Mx3M 0.386 0.385 -0.1 
3M 0.391 1Mx4M 0.383 0.382 -0.1 
4M 0.386 2Mx5M 0.371 0.370 -0.1 
5M 0.380 3Mx6M 0.370 0.371 0.1 
6M 0.381 6Mx12M 0.372 0.372 0.0 
12M 0.376     
Euribor FRA Replication (30
 
Dec. 2011) 
Euribor Depo. 
Maturity 
Euribor Deposit 
Quote (%) 
Euribor FRA 
Euribor FRA Quote 
(mid, %) 
Euribor FRA 
Replica (%) 
Difference Replica-
Quote (bps) 
1M 0.980 1Mx4M 1.223 1.500 27.7 
2M 1.150 2Mx5M 1.130 1.677 54.7 
3M 1.310 3Mx6M 1.067 1.804 73.7 
4M 1.380 4Mx7M 1.016 1.948 93.2 
5M 1.460 5Mx8M 0.964 2.080 111.6 
6M 1.560 6Mx9M 0.931 2.103 117.2 
7M 1.620 1Mx7M 1.471 1.728 25.7 
8M 1.690 2Mx8M 1.365 1.883 51.8 
9M 1.740 3Mx9M 1.292 1.958 66.6 
10M 1.790 4Mx10M 1.246 2.073 82.7 
11M 1.840 5Mx11M 1.200 2.154 95.4 
12M 1.900 6Mx12M 1.172 2.243 107.1 
18M 1.860 12Mx18M 1.125 1.736 61.1 
24M 1.870 18Mx24M 1.224 1.868 64.4 
  12Mx24M 1.481 1.800 31.9 
Table 1: top panel: comparison between Eonia OIS, FRA and Forward rates for several start/end 
dates quoted in the market. Bottom panel: the same for Euribor Deposits, FRA and Forward rates. 
Note that Euribor FRA contracts have different underlying rate tenors: 1Mx4M – 6Mx9M are 
indexed to the Euribor 3M, 1Mx7M – 18Mx24M are indexed to Euribor 6M, and 12Mx24M is 
indexed to the Euribor 12M (source: ICAP, reference date: 30 Dec. 2011). 
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Figure 4: Euribor FRA 6Mx12M market rate versus Eonia FRA 6Mx12M market rate versus 
Euribor Forward 6Mx12M rate (computed using equation 2). The corresponding spreads are 
shown on the right y-axis (Jan. 2007 – Dec. 2011 window, source: Bloomberg). 
 
 
Figure 5: he Euribor FRA 6Mx12M market rate versus Eonia FRA 6Mx12M market rate versus 
Eonia Forward 6Mx12M rate (computed using equation 3). The corresponding spreads are shown 
on the right y-axis (Jan. 2007 – Dec. 2011 window, source: Bloomberg). 
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2.3. Basis Swaps 
A third evidence of the regime change after the credit crunch is the explosion of the Basis Swaps 
spreads. In Figure 6 we report three historical series of quoted Basis Swap equilibrium spread, 
Euribor 3M vs Euribor 6M, Euribor 6M vs Euribor 12M, Euribor 3M vs Eonia, all at 5 years swap 
maturity. Basis Swaps are quoted on the Euro interbank market in terms of the difference between 
the fixed equilibrium swap rates of two swaps. For instance, the quoted Euribor 3M vs Euribor 6M 
Basis Swap rate is the difference between the equilibrium swap rates of a first standard swap with 
an Euribor 3M floating leg (quarterly frequency) vs a fixed leg (annual frequency), and of a second 
swap with an Euribor 6M floating leg (semi-annual frequency) vs a fixed leg (annual frequency). 
The frequency of the floating legs is the “tenor” of the corresponding Euribor rates. The Eonia 
floating legs are indexed to the shortest tenor rate (1 day), have annual frequency, and the floating 
coupon rate is given by the simple composition of the Eonia rates fixed daily during the coupon 
period. 
As we can see in Figure 6, the Basis Swap spreads were negligible (or even not quoted) before the 
crisis. They suddenly diverged in August 2007 and peaked in October 2008 with the Lehman 
crash. Figure 7 reports spot Basis Swap spreads (reference date 30/12/2011) for different pairs of 
rates on several maturities. Basis Swap spreads not directly observable on the market have been 
computed from market quotations. 
The Basis Swap involves a sequence of FRA rates carrying the credit and liquidity risk discussed 
in sections 2.1 and 2.2 above. Hence, the basis spread explosion can be interpreted in terms of the 
different credit and liquidity risk carried by the underlying FRA rates with different tenors, as in 
Figure 4. In Figure 6 and Figure 7 we see another example that, after the crisis, a swap floating leg 
indexed to the higher rate tenor (e.g. 6M) has an higher value with respect to the floating leg 
indexed to the shorter rate tenor (3M) with the same maturity, thus a positive spread emerges 
between the two corresponding equilibrium rates (or, in other words, a positive spread must be 
added to the 3M floating leg to equate the value of the 6M floating leg). In Figure 7 we observe that 
the magnitude of the Basis Swap spread increases with the tenor difference (see Bianchetti 2010 
and Bianchetti 2011). 
According to Morini (2009), a Basis Swap between two interbank counterparties under collateral 
agreement can be described as the difference between two investment strategies. Fixing, for 
instance, a Basis Swap Euribor 3M vs Euribor 6M with 6M maturity, scheduled on 3 dates   , 
        ,         , we have the following two strategies: 
1. 6M floating leg: at    choose a counterparty    with an high credit standing (that is, 
belonging to the Euribor Contribution Panel) with collateral agreement in place, and lend 
the notional for 6 months at the Euribor 6M rate prevailing at    (Euribor 6M flat because    
is an Euribor counterparty). At maturity    recover notional plus interest from   . Notice that 
if counterparty    defaults within 6 months we gain full recovery thanks to the collateral 
agreement. 
2. 3M+3M floating leg: at    choose a counterparty    with an high credit standing (belonging 
to the Euribor Contribution Panel) with collateral agreement in place, and lend the notional 
for 3 months at the Euribor 3M rate (flat) prevailing at   . At    recover notional plus interest 
and check the credit standing of   : if    has maintained its credit standing (it still belongs to 
the Euribor Contribution Panel), then lend the money again to    for 3 months at the 
Euribor 3M rate (flat) prevailing at   , otherwise choose another counterparty C2 belonging 
to the Euribor Panel with collateral agreement in place, and lend the money to C2 at the 
same interest rate. At maturity    recover notional plus interest from    or   . Again, if 
counterparties    or    defaults within 6 months we gain full recovery thanks to the 
collateral agreements. 
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Figure 6: Basis Swap spreads: Euribor 3M Vs Euribor 6M, Euribor 6M Vs Euribor 12M and Eonia 
Vs Euribor 3M (Jan. 2007 – Dec. 2011 window, source: Bloomberg). All the quotations present a 
maturity of 5Y. Notice that the daily market quotations for some Basis Swap were not even 
available before the crisis. 
 
 
Figure 7: Basis Swap spreads Eonia vs Euribor xM and Euribor xM vs yM over several maturities  
(reference date: 30/12/2011, source: Reuters). 
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Clearly, the 3M+3M leg implicitly embeds a bias towards the group of banks with the best credit 
standing, typically those belonging to the Euribor Contribution Panel. Hence, the credit risk carried 
by the 3M+3M leg must be lower than that carried by the 6M leg. In other words, the expected 
survival probability of the borrower in the 3M leg in the second 3M-6M period is higher than the 
survival probability of the borrower in the 6M leg in the same period. This lower risk is embedded 
into lower Euribor 3M + 3M rates with respect to Euribor 6M rates. But with collateralization the two 
legs have both negligible counterparty risk. Thus a positive spread must be added to the 3M+3M 
leg to reach equilibrium. The same discussion can be repeated, mutatis mutandis, in terms of 
liquidity risk. 
In Figure 8 we show a pictorial view of floating legs indexed to rates with different tenors. In 
equation 4 we report the corresponding leg values. 
 
 
Figure 8: representation of floating Swap legs with different tenors (12M, 6M, 3M, 1M, 1d). 
 
Before the financial crisis, since the liquidity and credit risk embedded in interbank rates with 
different tenors were very similar (and small), stream of cash flows with same maturity but different 
tenors  could be replicated one with each others, and all these floating legs had the same value. 
The start of the financial turmoil and the consequent explosion of Basis Swap spread between 
rates with different tenors has invalidated classical no-arbitrage relations, such as equations 1 and 
4, such that these floating legs acquired different values 
The start of the financial turmoil and the consequently explosion of Basis Swap spread between 
rates with different tenors has invalidated classical no-arbitrage relations that, such as the following 
one, do not hold anymore, 
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where            represents the net present value of the floating leg of a Swap indexed to the 
Euribor rate          with tenor   and with payment times according to the dates set   
         ,         is the FRA market rate referred to the period           associated to the Euribor 
rate with tenor   (i.e.                  ). 
 
 
Figure 9: representation of the interest rate market segmentation. 
 
We stress that the credit and liquidity risk involved here are those carried by the risky Libor rates 
underlying the Basis Swap, reflecting the average default and liquidity risk of the interbank money 
market (of the Libor panel banks), not those associated to the specific counterparties involved in 
the financial contract. We point out also that such effects were already present before the credit 
crunch, as discussed e.g. in Tuckman and Porfirio (2004), and well known to market players, but 
not effective due to negligible basis spreads. 
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2.4. The Credit and Liquidity Risk Components 
In this section we try to highlight the credit and liquidity risk impact on the historical trend of the 
Euribor – Eonia basis during the period Jan. 2007 – Dec. 2011. To this aim, we introduce two 
different indexes that help us to underline credit and liquidity market stress periods. 
Regarding the credit risk, we build an index representative of the credit risk in the European 
financial sector that we call Synthetic CDS Euribor Index. This index considers daily quotations 
of 5 years maturity CDS spread referred to financial institutions that belong to the Euribor panel in 
December 2011. Its computation replicates the fixing mechanism of the Euribor rates. Hence, for 
each reference date, we exclude the highest and the lowest 15% CDS spread quotations and 
compute the average of the remaining 70% quotes. The Synthetic CDS Euribor Index thus 
represents the average cost for protection against the default of a Libor panel bank within the 
European financial market. 
Regarding the liquidity risk, we compute an index, called Liquidity Surplus Index, that considers 
official data reported by the ECB. The index is given by the sum of the total amount of the deposits 
posted by the EU financial institutions at the ECB’s Deposit Facility and of the current account 
holdings exceeding the EUR market-wide level minimum reserve requirement that are held by EU 
financial institutions at the ECB. We refer to this aggregation as a proxy of the liquidity surplus in 
the Euro zone interbank market. 
The ECB requires credit and financial institutions to hold minimum reserves amounts on accounts 
managed by National Central Banks. The minimum reserve system has the scope of stabilizing the 
market interest rates and to facilitate the role of the ECB as liquidity supplier for the interbank 
market. The amount of minimum reserves is fixed, on a monthly basis, according to each financial 
institution’s reserve base and the compliance of the requirements is verified considering the 
average, during a certain maintenance period, of the amounts posted at the reserve accounts. This 
mechanism ensures flexibility to financial institutions that can face minimum reserves provisions 
without compromising their business or investing opportunities. Holdings of required reserves are 
remunerated at the Main Refinancing Operation (MRO) rate, while holdings that exceeded the 
reserve requirement are free of remuneration. The minimum reserve is a liquidity absorption 
standing facility (ECB 2010). 
The amounts posted by financial institutions at the Deposit Facility and the Excess Reserves help 
us to track liquidity stress of financial markets. Indeed, the higher is the Liquidity Surplus Index, the 
stronger is the preference to deposit cash reserves at the ECB instead of lending in the interbank 
market or investing in more profitable (and risky) activities. 
In Figure 10 we report the historical series of the Synthetic CDS Euribor Index vs the Euribor 6M – 
Eonia OIS 6M basis, of the market quotes of the Basis Swap Eonia Vs Euribor 3M and of the 
Synthetic CDS Euribor Index over the period Jan. 2007 – Dec. 2011. We can observe that the 
Synthetic CDS Euribor Index reached a first peak in August 2007 in relation to the rise of concerns 
over banks’ exposure to credit structured products (i.e. CDO, ABS etc.). This first increase of the 
premia against the default of primary financial institutions matched the explosion of the Euribor – 
Eonia basis (Figure 10 – spot 1) and it highlights a generalized growth of the default risk perceived 
in the interbank market reflected by an increase of the Euribor rates (see Figure 1). 
Since then. the index started to increase rapidly and maintaining an upward trend over the whole 
time interval we considered. The second and third peak of the Synthetic CDS Euribor Index are 
related to the bail-out of the investment bank Bear Stearns (14 March 2008, Figure 10 – spot 2) 
and to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (15 September 2008, Figure 10 – spot 3) respectively. 
The market uncertainty related to these two periods corresponds to an increase of the Euribor – 
Eonia basis. Before that a period of market relax occurred in 2009, the Synthetic CDS Euribor 
Index reached a fourth peak (March 2009, Figure 10 – spot 4) due to the deterioration of financial 
markets unlashed by the failure of Lehman Brothers. This increase of the credit risk perceived by 
the market is not reflected by a similar increase in terms of magnitude of the Euribor – Eonia basis 
that was mainly driven by the loosening monetary policy decisions of central banks. The Synthetic 
CDS Euribor Index reached its maximum during September 2011 (Figure 10 – spot 5), in 
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correspondence of Italy’s credit rating cut, and it was very far from the pre-crisis level when banks 
where considered “too big to fail”. This rise in the credit risk was matched by an increase of the 
Euribor – Eonia basis that reached 127 bps on 01 December 2011 (Figure 10 – spot 6). 
 
 
Figure 10: Synthetic CDS Euribor Index 5Y spread (line), Basis Swap Eonia Vs Euribor 3M 5Y 
spread (line, right scale) and Euribor Deposit 6M – Eonia OIS 6M basis (area) from Figure 1 (Jan. 
2007 – Dec. 2011 window, sources: Bloomberg and ICAP). Notice that the basis swap has the 
same payment frequency (3 months) and maturity (5Y) of the Synthetic CDS Index. 
 
Regarding the relation between the Basis Swap Eonia Vs Euribor 3M and the Synthetic CDS 
Euribor Index, we can observe a close trend of the two historical series, especially in 
correspondence of an increase of the credit risk perceived in the interbank market. The increase of 
the Basis Swap spread in correspondence of a rise in the average default risk seems to reveal a 
stronger relevance of the credit risk component over longer maturities (i.e. 5Y). 
The liquidity risk component in Euribor and Eonia interbank rates is distinct but strongly related to 
the credit risk component. According to Acerbi and Scandolo (2007), liquidity risk may appear in at 
least three circumstances: 
1. lack of liquidity to cover short term debt obligations (funding liquidity risk), 
2. difficulty to liquidate assets on the market due excessive bid-offer spreads (market liquidity 
risk), 
3. difficulty to borrow funds on the market due to excessive funding cost (systemic liquidity 
risk). 
Following Morini (2009), these three elements are, in principle, not a problem until they do not 
appear together, because a bank with, for instance, problem 1 and 2 (or 3) will be able to finance 
itself by borrowing funds (or liquidating assets) on the market. During the crisis these three 
scenarios manifested themselves jointly at the same time, thus generating a systemic lack of 
liquidity (see e.g. Michaud and Upper 2008). 
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Clearly, it is difficult to disentangle liquidity and credit risk components in the Euribor and Eonia 
rates, because, in particular, they do not refer to the default risk of one counterparty in a single 
derivative deal but to a money market with bilateral credit risk (see the discussion in Morini (2009) 
and references therein). 
In the Euro system the ECB is responsible of ensuring and maintaining the liquidity of the financial 
market through several monetary facilities and open market operations. Any liquidity injection in the 
interbank market should be absorbed by financial institutions. Before the financial turmoil, the 
liquidity provided by the ECB aimed mainly to satisfy the market’s liquidity needs and banks could 
rely on an easy and convenient access to the interbank market for their short term liquidity 
operations. 
In Figure 11 we compare the historical trend of the Synthetic CDS Euribor Index, of the Liquidity 
Surplus Index, of the Euribor 6M – Eonia OIS 6M basis and of the Basis Swap Eonia Vs Euribor 
3M. The first main intervention of the ECB during the financial crisis was in October 2008 (Figure 
11 – spot 1) an it regarded the adoption of several measures such as the cut of the official interests 
rates in conjunction with others central banks3, the introduction of a fixed-rate refinancing operation 
with full-allotment, the extension of the securities accepted as collateral by the central bank and the 
increase of the number of financial institutions that can accede to the ECB monetary policy 
channels (ECB 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2008d). As we can observe in Figure 11, the new monetary 
policy decisions put in force by the ECB led to a sudden explosion of the Liquidity Surplus that 
exactly matches the most relevant increase experienced by the Euribor – Eonia spread during the 
period Jan. 2007 – Dec. 2011. 
The Liquidity Surplus Index reached a second peak on the 25 June 2009 (Figure 11 – spot 2) and 
its increase is due to the introduction by the central bank of a LTRO with a 12M term (ECB 2009a). 
This non-standard facility provided the European financial market with an unlimited amount of 
liquidity with 1 year maturity. This intervention reduced the liquidity shortage of the market and it is 
accompanied by a reduction of the Euribor – Eonia basis and a decrease of the credit risk reflected 
by the Synthetic CDS Euribor Index.  
At the end of the 2009 (Figure 11 – spot 3) we can notice a third jump in the liquidity amount 
posted at the ECB. This sudden variation can be ascribed to the extension of the fixed-rate 
refinancing operations with full allotment introduced in October 2008 (ECB 2009b).  
From Figure 11 we note that the Liquidity Surplus index experienced an upward trend during the 
period Jan. 2010 – Jul. 2010 that is exacerbated in May 2010 by the worsening of the so called 
“sovereign debt crisis” related to market concerns over Greece’s capability to maintain its debt 
obligations. The effects of this market uncertainty are reflected also by the Synthetic CDS Euribor 
index that increased almost up to 200 bps in June 2010. The LTRO introduced in June 2009 by the 
ECB expired at the end of May 2010 (Figure 11 – spot 4). The amount of liquidity surplus shrank 
significantly and the Liquidity Surplus Index decreased until July 2011.  
During the period Jul. 2009 – Jul 2011 the Euribor – Eonia basis has maintained a relative stable 
and low level compared to Aug. 2007 – Jun. 2009, showing contained peaks in correspondence of 
a simultaneous increase of both the Liquidity Surplus Index and the Synthetic Surplus Index. 
The second half of the 2011 was characterized by the second phase of the sovereign debt crisis 
that started to affect countries such as Italy and Spain. The market conditions in terms of credit and 
liquidity risk deteriorated significantly and that was promptly reflected by the increase of both the 
Liquidity Surplus Index and the Synthetic CDS Euribor Index. In this period the Eonia OIS rates 
decreased significantly and Euribor rates remained almost stable (see Figure 1) leading to a 
relevant rise of the correspondent basis. 
The Liquidity Surplus Index reached its maximum on the 22nd December 2011 (Figure 11 – spot 5) 
in correspondence of the ECB’s decision to put in place a multi-tranche LTRO with a maturity of 3 
years (ECB 2011). The first LTRO tranche, which took place in the 21 December 2011, provided 
€489.2 billion to 523 financial institutions (ECB 2012) The next day the Liquidity Surplus Index hit a 
                                               
3
 The Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and the Swiss National Bank. 
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value of €483 billion and almost all the liquidity offered to the market by the ECB was posted at the 
ECB’s accounts. The difficult credit and liquidity conditions experienced by the European financial 
market in the last half of 2011 led to a significant increase in the Euribor – Eonia basis. 
 
 
Figure 11: Synthetic CDS Euribor index 5Y (line), Liquidity Surplus Index of the European 
interbank market (line, right scale), Basis Swap Eonia Vs Euribor 3M 5Y (line) and Euribor Deposit 
6M – Eonia OIS 6M basis (area). We multiplied by 4 the Basis Swap Eonia Vs Euribor 3M 5Y to 
better compare its historical trend (window Jan. 2007 – Dec. 2011, sources: Bloomberg and ECB). 
 
In Figure 12 we compare the trend of the Liquidity Surplus index and of the Eonia Volume. We can 
observe that an increase in the liquidity amount posted at the ECB is always accompanied by a 
reduction of the total amount traded in the European money market. The drain of liquidity that 
affected the money market is the main reason of the closeness of the Eonia rate to the Deposit 
Facility rate during the financial crisis (see Figure 2). 
By considering the trend of the Liquidity Surplus Index we argue that from the Lehman Brothers’ 
bankruptcy up to the end of the 2011 the liquidity risk factor has played a key role, in conjunction 
with the credit risk, in explaining the trend of the Euribor – Eonia basis. Generally, we can observe 
an increase of the difference between Euribor and Eonia OIS rates when both the Synthetic CDS 
Euribor Index and the Liquidity surplus Index start to go up. This combined upward movement 
reveals an increase of the overall risk perceived within the interbank market. Observing the 
historical series reported in Figure 11, we claim that the Euribor – Eonia basis’ peak of October 
2008 is caused, initially, by the increase in the average default risk of the market in 
correspondence of the Lehman crash and, subsequently, by the liquidity risk in the interbank 
market and the drastic official interest rate cut operated by the ECB during that period. Also in the 
second half of 2011, the upward trend of the Euribor – Eonia basis was driven by a simultaneous 
rise of both the credit and liquidity risk in the interbank market, reflected in the market through a 
decrease of the Eonia OIS rates and almost stable Euribor rates. 
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Figure 12: moving average 20 days of the Liquidity Surplus index and of the Eonia Volume 
(window Jan. 2007 – Dec. 2011). Note that we reported the Eonia Volume on the right scale since 
the two historical series present different magnitudes. (Sources: Bloomberg, ECB). 
 
 
2.5. A Simple Credit Model 
In order to explain the basis divergence after the credit crunch, Mercurio (2009) proposed a simple 
credit model, including the default risk relative to an average interbank counterparty 
We assume that the risky Libor rate           fixed on the interbank market by the Libor panel is 
precisely the funding rate over the time interval         of an abstract “average” Libor Bank. We 
may define as usual a discount factor           such that  
          
 
                   
   
(5) 
This discount factor may be naturally associated with a risky zero coupon bond           issued by 
such average Libor Bank with maturity  . Denoting by       the default time at time   of the Libor 
Bank, by     ,           the constant loss given default and recovery rate, respectively, 
associated with its default, and assuming independence between default and interest rates, we can 
price this zero coupon bond as 
M. Bianchetti, M. Carlicchi Markets Evolution After The Credit Crunch 
 
 
Page 20 of 35 
          
                                     
   
                                       
   
                              
   
                  
             
               
                             
                     
                     
 
 
   
                                  
               
                
              
                  
(6) 
where        ,         is the value in   of a default free zero coupon bond with maturity  , 
  
   is the expected value in   under the risk neutral probability measure   ,    is the default free 
instantaneous interest rate, and           ,              are the spot and forward default 
probabilities of the Libor Bank, respectively. By considering the above assumptions, the risky Libor 
rate           is given by 
          
 
        
 
 
         
    
 
        
 
 
                       
     
(7) 
Using equation 7 above, we can obtain the price in   of a standard FRA contract that exchanges in 
  the fixed rate   versus the risky Libor rate           as  
                      
                                  
     
                     
 
         
               
     
              
             
 
                       
                
     
              
   
 
              
                          
     
   
        
              
                        
    
        
             
                         
(8) 
where   is the notional of the contract,         for a payer/receiver FRA (referred to the fixed 
leg). The price of the market FRA is obtained through an analogous proof as 
                      
           
           
                   
          
                                                 
                                 (9) 
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We stress that the prices in equations 8 and 9 above have been nder the assumption that the FRA 
contract (not the underlying Libor rate) is credit risk free. Otherwise the derivation would involve the 
default indicator of the two counterparties involved in the FRA contract (not that of the average 
Libor Bank). 
Assuming that the FRA contract is in equilibrium, such that                 , denoting with 
                the equilibrium FRA rate at time   and rearranging equations 8 and 9, we obtain 
    
                 
             
 
        
 
        
        
 
             
     
(10) 
Since        and                 , we have that                   then 
              
 
        
 
        
        
 
             
    
 
 
        
 
        
        
    
             
   
  
  
            
(11) 
where             is the default free forward rate. We conclude that, thanks to default risk, the risky 
FRA rate is always higher than the corresponding forward rate relative to a default free yield curve. 
In other words, the default risk of the average Libor Bank, included into the Libor rate underlying a 
risk free FRA contract, induces a positive basis spread between the equilibrium FRA rate and a 
corresponding risk free forward rate. Only in the special case of a risk free Libor Bank, such that 
              , we have 
                           
              
 
        
 
        
        
                 
(12) 
A risk free derivative could sound a little strange, in a market where even Libor Banks may default, 
but actually this ideal condition can be approximated in practice using collateralization, as 
discussed in the next section. 
 
3. Collateralization and CSA Discounting 
Another effect of the credit crunch has been the great diffusion of collateral agreements to reduce 
the counterparty risk of OTC derivatives positions. In the following sections we discuss some of the 
relevant aspects that concern the collateralization process. 
 
3.1. Collateral Diffusion 
Nowadays most of the counterparties on the interbank market have mutual collateral agreements 
in place. In 2011, almost 85% of all OTC derivatives transactions were collateralized, according to 
the ISDA (International Swaps and Derivatives Association) Margin Survey (ISDA 2012a). 
Respondents to the ISDA Margin Survey are divided in three different categories: large, medium 
and small dealers. The definition between the types of dealers is based on the number of active 
collateral agreements. Large dealers must have more than 3000 active agreements, while  
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Figure 13: growth of the collateral value over the last 12 years (source: ISDA 2012a). 
 
respondents that present active collateral agreements between 3000 and 100 are classified as 
medium market participant. Small dealers are financial institution and companies that report less 
than 100 active contracts. Among the 51 respondents, 14 are classified as large dealers and 
belong to the financial sector. The total number of respondents to the Margin Survey in 2012 is 51. 
Figure 13 shows the growth in value of reported and estimated collateral in circulation within the 
OTC derivatives market. We can observe an upward trend of the collateral value over all the past 
12 years, except between 2008 and 2010 where the reduction can be ascribed to a decrease in the 
market activity. During the 2011 the reported and the estimated value of collateral have 
experienced an increase of 24%. 
As shown in Table 2, more than 80% of all OTC derivatives are collateralized among large dealers. 
Credit derivative contracts present the highest frequency of collateralization followed by Fixed 
Income derivatives. The FX derivatives show the lowest percentage of collateralization (58.3%), 
but their poor result can be explained by the fact that this type of contract is usually characterized 
by short maturities that, compared to the other contract classes, help to mitigate the counterparty 
risk. The percentages of collateralization related to large dealers are always higher than those of 
other classes of market participants, regardless the type of OTC Derivatives. 
 
 All Large Dealers 
All OTC Derivatives 71.4% 83.7% 
Fixed Income Derivatives 78.1% 89.9% 
Credit Derivatives 93.4% 96.1% 
FX Derivatives 55.6% 70.6% 
Equity Derivatives 72.7% 85.3% 
Commodities Derivatives 56.3% 63.9% 
Table 2: percentage of trades subjected to collateral agreements by derivative and dealer type 
(source: ISDA 2012a).  
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3.2. Collateral Mechanics 
A typical financial transaction generates streams of future cash flows whose total net present value 
(NPV) is the algebraic sum of all discounted expected cash flows. Generally, each transaction 
implies a mutual credit exposure between two counterparties, let’s say, a bank ( ) and a generic 
market counterparty ( ). If, at any time   during the life of the transaction, for counterparty   we 
have that          , then counterparty   expects to receive, on average, future cash flows from 
counterparty   (in other words,   has an expected credit with   at time  ). On the other side, if 
counterparty   has          , then it expects to pay, on average, future cash flows to 
counterparty   (in other words,   has an expected debt with   at time  ). The reverse holds if 
          and          .  
Such credit/debit exposure is clearly subject to bilateral default risk, the probability that the debtor 
counterparty may default, not fulfilling its obligations with the creditor counterparty. This credit risk 
can be mitigated through a guarantee, called “collateral agreement”. This guarantee is formalised 
into an optional annex of the ISDA Master Agreement (the standard legal contract widely used to 
regulate OTC transactions) called Credit Support Annex (CSA). The main feature of the CSA is the 
additional obligation of the counterparties for a margination mechanism similar to those adopted by 
Central Counterparties (CCPs, i.e. LCH.Clearnet, Euroclear, SIX Securities Services, etc.) for OTC 
derivatives clearing, or by exchanges for standard market instruments clearing (i.e. Futures). In a 
nutshell, at every margination date the two counterparties check the value of the portfolio of mutual 
OTC transactions and regulate the margin, adding to or subtracting from the collateral account the 
corresponding mark to market variation with respect to the preceding margination date. The 
margination can be regulated with cash or with (primary) assets of corresponding value. In any 
case the collateral account holds, at each date, the total NPV of the portfolio, which is positive for 
the creditor counterparty and negative for the debtor counterparty. The collateral amount is 
available to the creditor.  
On the other side, the debtor receives an interest on the collateral amount, called “collateral rate”. 
Hence, we can look at the CSA as a funding mechanism, transferring liquidity from the debtor to 
the creditor. The main differences with traditional funding through Deposit contracts are that, using 
derivatives, we have longer maturities and variable (stochastic) lending/borrowing sides and 
amounts. We can also look at CSA as an hedging mechanism, where the collateral amount hedges 
the creditor against the event of default of the debtor. The most diffused CSA provides a daily 
margination mechanism and an overnight collateral rate (ISDA 2012a). Actual CSAs provide many 
other detailed features (i.e. credit support amount, delivery amount, minimum transfer amount, 
collateral currency, etc.) that are out of the scope of the present discussion. 
Figure 14 illustrates a general scheme of funding with or without CSA that we briefly introduced 
above. When both the counterparties can post and receive collateral, the CSA mechanisms is 
called “two-way-CSA” (Figure 14, left panel) and it allows counterparties to fund OTC deals at the 
relevant collateral rate. If no collateral agreement is in place, the bank has to recur to the money 
market to find the necessary amounts      to fund the transaction, at the relevant money market 
rate (i.e. Euribor) plus, generally, a spread      corresponding to its credit quality and interbank 
market conditions (Figure 14, right panel). 
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3.3. CSA Discounting 
A first important consequence of the diffusion of collateral agreements among interbank 
counterparties is that we can consider the derivatives’ prices quoted on the OTC interbank market 
as transactions between counterparties under CSA. A second important consequence is that, by 
no-arbitrage and self-financing conditions, the CSA margination rate and the discounting rate of 
future cash flows must match, hence the name of “CSA discounting” (or “OIS discounting”). In 
particular, the most diffused overnight CSA implies overnight-based discounting and the 
construction of a discounting yield curve that must reflect, for each maturity, the funding level in an 
overnight collateralized interbank market. Thus OIS are the natural instruments for the discounting 
curve construction, that are also the best available proxies of risk free rates (see Ametrano and 
Bianchetti 2009, Bianchetti 2010). 
The CSA discounting approach for the evaluation of collateralized OTC trades can be described by 
considering a simple cash flow transaction trade between two generic default free counterparties 
(bank   and a generic market counterparty  ) with payoff      at maturity time  . We assume that 
the deal is under perfect collateralization with margination dates                 , where    
 , and perfect collateral account    such that 
           for each     , 
                              , 
where          is the simply compounded collateral rate (i.e. Eonia) fixed at time      and covering 
the interval    . The payoff of the trade and the structure of the margination dates are shown in 
Figure 15. 
 
Figure 14: two-way-CSA with cash collateral and no-CSA funding mechanics. 
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Figure 15: simple deal with a single cash flow payoff and multiple margination dates. 
 
Suppose that the trade is under collateral with only two margination dates,    and  , and   
receives a positive amount      at maturity  , which correspond to a present value       at time 
  , as depicted in Figure 16. Hence, counterparty   posts an amount        into the collateral bank 
account that grows at the collateral rate        up to maturity  . By no-arbitrage and self-financing 
we have 
                                   
                          where          
 
                
  
We can conclude that, by simple no-arbitrage arguments, future cash flows associated with 
collateralized trades must be discounted at the collateral rate. 
 
 
Figure 16: trade and collateral account cash flows scheme. 
 
In case of absence of CSA, using the same no-arbitrage and self-financing principles between the 
funding and the discounting rate, we argue that future cash flows (positive or negative) must be 
discounted using the corresponding funding term structure. This implies important (and rather 
involved) consequences, such that, according with Morini and Prampolini (2011), each 
counterparty assigns a different present value to the same future cash flow, breaking the fair value 
symmetry. Indeed, a worsening of the its credit standing allows the Bank to sell derivatives (options 
in particular) at more competitive prices (the lower the rate, the higher the discount, the lower the 
price). 
We stress that before the crisis the old-style standard Libor curve was representative of the 
average funding level on the interbank market (see e.g. Hull 2008). Such curve, even if considered 
a good proxy for a risk free curve, due to the perceived low counterparty risk of primary banks 
(belonging to the Libor Contribution panel), was not strictly risk free because of the absence of 
collateralization. 
Even if the collateralization of OTC contracts has become the best market practice since the start 
of the financial crisis, there are still some confusion and controversial aspects (Sawyer 2011a, 
2011b, 2012). For example, most of the CSAs allow collateral in multiple eligible types (e.g. cash, 
securities, or assets) and  currencies (e.g. EUR, USD). Counterparties are often allowed to switch 
collateral during the life of the deal. Following the discussion above, changing e.g. the collateral 
currency implies changing the discounting curve, that leads to a change in the NPV of the contract. 
Hence, multi-currency CSA implies a cheapest-to-deliver collateral currency option on the 
underlying portfolio of instruments under CSA. This is an important friction against unwinding and 
back-loading existing trades on to CCPs because changes in the discounting curves and collateral 
currency options may be very expensive. 
In order to avoid confusion in the market, reduce margin disputes and settlement risk (i.e. Herstatt 
risk), ISDA has developed a new Standard CSA (SCSA) where the hidden optionalities of the old 
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CSA are reduced. The new SCSA introduces different “silos” corresponding to the currencies with 
the most liquid OIS curves (e.g. EUR, USD, GBP, CHF, JPY). Each transaction is allocated to one 
single silo, in relation with the currency of the underlying, with the relevant OIS rate used to 
discount all the trade’s cash flows. According to this mechanics, counterparties will have to 
manage multiple flows of collateral in different currencies that will create a systemic cross currency 
settlement risk (i.e. two counterparties, two swaps, one in EUR, one in USD). To solve the problem 
the SCSA allows counterparties to net collateral flows denominated in multiple currencies into a 
single payment in a single currency using the overnight currency swap market to exchange the 
flows (ISDA 2012b). However, implementing the SCSA requires to solve some relevant challenges 
such as the adoption of a common set of exchange rates and calculation specifications for 
managing collateralized trades. 
 
3.4. Market Quotes 
During the financial crisis, the market has experienced a transitional phase from the classical Libor-
based discounting methodology to the modern CSA based discounting methodology. As we notice 
in section 3.1, OTC transactions executed on the interbank market normally use CSA discounting. 
In particular, plain vanilla interest rate derivatives, such as FRA, Swaps, Basis Swaps, 
Caps/Floor/Swaptions are quoted by main brokers using CSA discounting.  
In particular in September 2010 the international broker ICAP switched to OIS discounting, 
publishing both Libor- and OIS-based cap/floor/swaption implied volatilities. Since January 2012 
only OIS-based volatilities are published (ICAP 2010, 2011).  
In order to appreciate the implied evolution of the market quotes, we show in Figure 17, Figure 18, 
Figure 19 below the market quotations of EUR Swaption premia and volatilities on three different 
dates that cover the period Jun. 2010 – May 2012. Figure 17 shows the standard pre-crisis quotes 
for EUR Swaption premia and volatilities (reference date 30 June 2010), obtained by using the 
classical single-curve approach. Figure 18 shows the quotes for EUR Swaption on 30 September 
2010, where we can notice two new panels, Figure 18 – panel C and Figure 18 – panel D. The first  
shows the forward EUR Swaption premia, while the second shows the implied EUR ATM Swaption 
volatility surface obtained using the modern multiple-curve CSA discounting methodology (i.e. 
Eonia discounts, Euribor6M forwards, consistent with EUR Swaps and CSA). The implied volatility 
surface of Figure 18 – panel D is retrieved from the quoted premia using classical Euribor 
discounting. We point out that the two different implied volatility surfaces, coherently with the two 
pricing methodologies, lead to the same premia, assuming the instrument is traded between OTC 
counterparties under mutual SCSA in EUR . Finally, Figure 19 shows the market quotes for EUR 
Swaption on 31 January 2012. Only the OIS-based implied volatility surface appears (Figure 19 – 
panel D), while both Euribor- and Eonia-based spot prices are reported (Figure 19 – panel B and C 
respectively), consistently with the two different pricing approaches for trades under collateral or 
not. 
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Figure 17: EUR at-the-money Swaption market quotes on 30 June 2010. Premia (left panel) and 
Black’s implied volatilities (right panel). The ATM implied volatilities surface is obtained using the 
classical single-curve approach. (Source: ICAP). 
 
 
Figure 18: EUR at-the-money Swaption market quotes on 30 September 2010. Premia are 
distinguished between spot (panel A) and forward ones (panel C). Implied spot premia are 
obtained from forward premia using Eonia discounting. Implied volatilities quotes are now 
differentiated between the Euribor one (panel B) and the Eonia one (panel D). (Source: ICAP). 
 
A B
Option Expiry 1Y 2Y 3Y 4Y 5Y 6Y 7Y 8Y 9Y 10Y 15Y 20Y 25Y 30Y Option Expiry 1Y 2Y 3Y 4Y 5Y 6Y 7Y 8Y 9Y 10Y 15Y 20Y 25Y 30Y
1M Opt 11 24.5 38.5 53 68 83.5 99 115 129 144 205 261 319 389 1M Opt 46.4 39.2 35.9 32.3 29.9 28.1 27 26.3 25.6 25.1 23.3 23.5 24.9 27.6
2M Opt 16.5 37 58 79.5 101 122 143 163 183 203 290 373 456 548 2M Opt 48.8 40.6 37 33.4 30.8 28.6 27.1 25.9 25.2 24.7 23.1 23.5 25 27.3
3M Opt 22.5 50.5 77.5 104 129 153 177 201 225 250 355 458 564 666 3M Opt 51.7 44.1 39.5 34.8 31.2 28.7 27 25.8 25 24.6 22.9 23.4 25.1 27
6M Opt 37.5 81 121 158 195 231 265 298 330 362 499 624 763 919 6M Opt 57.9 47.4 41.2 35.9 32.2 29.7 27.8 26.5 25.5 24.8 22.7 22.6 24.1 26.4
9M Opt 50 107 157 205 252 295 337 378 417 455 622 767 931 1104 9M Opt 59.9 48.4 41.4 36.2 32.7 30.1 28.2 26.9 25.9 25.1 22.9 22.6 24 26
1Y Opt 61.5 126 186 245 300 352 402 449 495 536 734 900 1081 1256 1Y Opt 59.5 46.6 40.2 35.7 32.4 30 28.3 27.1 26.1 25.1 23.2 22.9 24.1 25.6
18M Opt 78.5 158 233 305 373 437 498 557 612 666 902 1116 1318 1512 18M Opt 53.9 42.1 36.9 33.2 30.6 28.7 27.4 26.3 25.4 24.8 23 23.1 24 25.2
2Y Opt 94 183 268 349 427 503 574 641 705 767 1028 1259 1492 1708 2Y Opt 48.2 37.6 33.5 30.6 28.6 27.3 26.3 25.4 24.6 24.1 22.5 22.5 23.6 24.7
3Y Opt 111 214 312 405 494 581 663 740 815 888 1182 1447 1726 1991 3Y Opt 35.5 29.9 27.4 25.8 24.7 24 23.3 22.8 22.3 22 20.9 21.2 22.5 23.8
4Y Opt 121.5 235 341 441 537 630 719 803 885 965 1282 1571 1874 2153 4Y Opt 28.3 25.2 23.8 22.9 22.2 21.7 21.2 20.9 20.6 20.5 19.8 20.3 21.6 22.8
5Y Opt 126.5 244 357 464 565 661 754 842 929 1011 1351 1656 1963 2274 5Y Opt 24 22.1 21.5 21 20.5 20.1 19.8 19.6 19.4 19.4 19.1 19.7 21 22.3
7Y Opt 129 250 367 480 587 686 783 878 971 1062 1411 1730 2049 2375 7Y Opt 19.7 19 18.8 18.5 18.3 18.1 18 18 18 18.2 18.2 19 20.2 21.4
10Y Opt 128.5 247 364 477 586 689 791 891 988 1082 1444 1763 2092 2404 10Y Opt 16.9 16.5 16.5 16.6 16.8 16.9 17 17.2 17.5 17.7 18.2 19.1 20.2 21.2
15Y Opt 123 235 348 461 569 673 775 874 968 1057 1407 1722 2043 2352 15Y Opt 17 16.9 17.2 17.6 18.1 18.5 18.8 19.3 19.7 20 20.7 21.3 22 22.6
20Y Opt 113.5 220 326 434 540 640 736 829 915 994 1337 1627 1910 2164 20Y Opt 19.9 20.2 20.8 21.8 22.6 23.2 23.8 24.3 24.6 24.7 24.4 23.8 23.6 23.3
25Y Opt 104.5 201 300 401 500 591 676 764 843 918 1220 1483 1726 1946 25Y Opt 26 26.1 26.8 27.8 28.5 28.6 28.4 28.4 28 27.7 25.3 23.7 22.7 22.4
30Y Opt 95 180 267 355 442 522 598 676 746 812 1092 1337 1569 1791 30Y Opt 27.6 26.2 26 26 26.1 25.8 25.5 25.4 25 24.6 22.4 21.1 20.8 21.2
Sw ap Tenor Maturity
30/06/2010 - EUR ATM Swaption Straddles - Premium Mids 30/06/2010 - EUR ATM Swaption Straddles - Implied Volatilities
A B
Option Expiry 1Y 2Y 3Y 4Y 5Y 6Y 7Y 8Y 9Y 10Y 15Y 20Y 25Y 30Y Option Expiry 1Y 2Y 3Y 4Y 5Y 6Y 7Y 8Y 9Y 10Y 15Y 20Y 25Y 30Y
1M Opt 10.5 25.5 41 57.5 76.5 96.5 117 138 161 185 270 346 420 494 1M Opt 40.5 38.4 37.9 36.8 36.4 35.9 35.5 35.4 35.8 36.4 34.4 34.4 36.1 38.6
2M Opt 15.5 37.5 60 85.5 115 141 168 198 227 261 379 486 592 700 2M Opt 40.4 38.6 37.6 37.2 37.1 35.8 34.9 34.7 34.6 35.1 33.2 33.3 35 37.7
3M Opt 20 49.5 78.5 110 142 176 209 243 278 315 458 583 711 841 3M Opt 41.1 40.8 39.5 38.4 37.2 36.1 35.1 34.6 34.4 34.5 32.8 32.7 34.5 37.1
6M Opt 32 76.5 116 159 205 250 293 340 385 430 620 796 961 1131 6M Opt 44.1 42.8 39.8 38.1 36.8 35.3 34.2 33.7 33.2 32.9 31.2 31.6 33 35.4
9M Opt 44.5 98.5 149 202 255 308 361 414 468 523 751 953 1148 1358 9M Opt 47 43.1 40.3 38 36.1 34.6 33.5 32.8 32.4 32.1 30.6 30.7 32.1 34.6
1Y Opt 54.5 117 177 235 296 360 419 479 540 599 852 1074 1300 1526 1Y Opt 47.6 42.7 39.7 37 35.2 34.1 33 32.3 31.8 31.4 29.9 29.9 31.5 33.7
18M Opt 75 149 222 296 369 441 512 582 655 729 1020 1286 1542 1792 18M Opt 48.8 41.2 38.1 35.8 34 32.7 31.8 31.1 30.7 30.5 29 29.2 30.6 32.5
2Y Opt 92.5 179 262 344 428 510 589 667 747 825 1156 1449 1731 2002 2Y Opt 47.8 40.1 36.7 34.1 32.6 31.5 30.7 30 29.6 29.3 28.2 28.5 29.9 31.6
3Y Opt 112.5 217 315 411 509 604 697 785 874 967 1328 1665 1992 2305 3Y Opt 40.8 35 32.2 30.4 29.5 28.7 28.2 27.6 27.3 27.3 26.3 26.9 28.5 30.2
4Y Opt 124.5 240 349 455 556 658 756 852 946 1049 1427 1778 2125 2447 4Y Opt 34.3 30.3 28.5 27.4 26.6 26.1 25.6 25.3 25.1 25.3 24.5 25.3 26.9 28.4
5Y Opt 131 253 367 476 583 689 792 895 996 1100 1497 1852 2197 2549 5Y Opt 29.2 26.7 25.6 24.8 24.3 24 23.7 23.6 23.6 23.8 23.4 24.1 25.6 27.2
7Y Opt 133.5 259 377 494 606 717 825 928 1031 1141 1539 1900 2249 2605 7Y Opt 23.6 22.5 22 21.6 21.3 21.2 21.3 21.3 21.4 21.7 21.6 22.6 23.9 25.4
10Y Opt 136 263 388 508 626 739 849 953 1058 1166 1563 1928 2270 2594 10Y Opt 20 19.5 19.6 19.7 19.8 19.9 20 20.1 20.3 20.6 21.1 22.3 23.4 24.3
15Y Opt 130 251 371 487 598 709 817 922 1029 1134 1515 1888 2223 2539 15Y Opt 19.3 19.2 19.4 19.6 19.8 20.2 20.7 21.2 21.7 22.3 23.3 24.4 25.1 25.4
20Y Opt 119.5 235 348 460 569 676 780 881 981 1068 1444 1780 2087 2356 20Y Opt 21.4 22.1 22.9 23.7 24.5 25.3 26.1 26.8 27.4 27.7 27.8 27.5 27 26.3
25Y Opt 110 214 320 426 528 628 722 811 904 990 1324 1621 1896 2142 25Y Opt 28.2 29.3 30.3 31.4 32.1 32.6 32.6 32.5 32.6 32.3 29.6 27.5 26.1 25.5
30Y Opt 101.5 196 289 384 477 565 651 732 816 893 1203 1485 1751 2012 30Y Opt 32.5 31.5 31.1 31.1 31.1 30.9 30.7 30.3 30.1 29.6 26.2 24.4 23.9 24.4
C D
Option Expiry 1Y 2Y 3Y 4Y 5Y 6Y 7Y 8Y 9Y 10Y 15Y 20Y 25Y 30Y Option Expiry 1Y 2Y 3Y 4Y 5Y 6Y 7Y 8Y 9Y 10Y 15Y 20Y 25Y 30Y
1M Opt 10.5 25.5 41 57.5 76.5 96.5 117 138 161 185 270 346 421 495 1M Opt 40.6 38.4 37.9 36.8 36.3 35.8 35.5 35.4 35.8 36.4 34.4 34.4 36.1 38.6
2M Opt 15.5 37.5 60 86 115 141 169 198 228 261 379 486 592 701 2M Opt 40.4 38.6 37.6 37.1 37.1 35.8 34.9 34.7 34.6 35.1 33.2 33.3 35 37.7
3M Opt 20 49.5 78.5 110 142 176 209 243 278 315 459 584 712 842 3M Opt 41.1 40.8 39.5 38.3 37.1 36.1 35.1 34.6 34.4 34.5 32.8 32.7 34.4 37
SM Opt 32 76.5 116 160 206 250 294 341 386 431 622 799 964 1135 6M Opt 44.1 42.7 39.7 38 36.7 35.3 34.1 33.6 33.1 32.8 31.2 31.5 33 35.3
9M Opt 44.5 99 150 203 257 310 363 417 471 526 756 959 1155 1366 9M Opt 46.9 43 40.2 37.8 36 34.5 33.4 32.7 32.3 32.1 30.6 30.6 32.1 34.5
1Y Opt 55 118 178 237 299 363 423 483 545 605 859 1083 1311 1539 1Y Opt 47.5 42.5 39.6 36.8 35.1 34 32.9 32.2 31.7 31.3 29.8 29.8 31.4 33.6
18M Opt 76 151 225 300 374 447 519 590 664 739 1035 1303 1564 1817 18M Opt 48.7 41 37.9 35.6 33.8 32.5 31.6 30.9 30.5 30.3 28.8 29 30.5 32.3
2Y Opt 94.5 183 268 351 437 520 601 681 762 842 1179 1479 1767 2042 2Y Opt 47.6 39.8 36.4 33.8 32.4 31.3 30.5 29.8 29.4 29.1 28 28.3 29.7 31.4
3Y 0pt 116.5 225 327 426 528 625 722 814 906 1002 1376 1726 2064 2388 3Y Opt 40.5 34.6 31.9 30 29.2 28.4 27.9 27.4 27 27 26 26.6 28.2 29.8
4Y 0pt 131.5 254 369 480 588 695 798 900 999 1108 1507 1878 2244 2585 4Y Opt 34 29.9 28.1 27 26.2 25.7 25.3 25 24.8 24.9 24.2 24.9 26.5 27.9
5Y 0pt 141.5 273 396 514 630 744 856 967 1076 1189 1618 2001 2374 2754 5Y Opt 28.9 26.3 25.2 24.4 23.9 23.6 23.3 23.2 23.2 23.4 23 23.7 25.1 26.7
TY 0pt 152 295 431 564 691 819 942 1059 1177 1302 1757 2168 2567 2974 TY Opt 23.2 22 21.5 21.1 20.8 20.8 20.8 20.8 20.9 21.2 21.1 22 23.3 24.7
10Y 0pt 170.5 329 487 638 785 927 1065 1195 1327 1463 1960 2419 2848 3255 10Y Opt 19.6 18.9 19 19.1 19.2 19.3 19.4 19.5 19.7 20 20.4 21.6 22.6 23.5
15Y 0pt 193 374 552 725 890 1055 1217 1373 1532 1688 2256 2810 3309 3780 15Y Opt 18.8 18.4 18.6 18.8 19 19.4 19.8 20.3 20.8 21.4 22.2 23.3 23.9 24.2
20Y 0pt 209 410 608 804 994 1181 1363 1539 1714 1866 2523 3110 3645 4115 20Y Opt 20.6 20.9 21.6 22.4 23.1 23.9 24.5 25.2 25.8 26 26 25.8 25.2 24.7
25Y 0pt 218 424 633 843 1047 1244 1430 1607 1791 1961 2622 3209 3755 4241 25Y Opt 27.2 27 28.1 29 29.4 29.6 29.4 29.2 29.3 29.6 27.2 25.3 24.1 23.7
30Y 0pt 220.5 425 629 833 1035 1227 1414 1590 1771 1939 2613 3226 3803 4369 30Y Opt 29.2 26.9 26.7 26.9 28 27.1 27.2 27 27.1 26.8 23.9 22.3 22 22.3
Sw ap Tenor
Sw ap Tenor
Sw ap Tenor
Sw ap Tenor
30/09/2010 - EUR ATM Swaption Straddles - Fwd Premium Mids 30/09/2010 - EUR ATM Swaption Straddles - Implied Volatilities
30/09/2010 - EUR ATM Swaption Straddles - Implied Spot Premium Mids 30/09/2010 - EUR ATM Swaption Straddles - Implied Volatilities (Euribor disc)
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Figure 19: EUR at-the-money Swaption market quotes on 31 May 2012. Premia on the left upper 
panel (panel A) are spot premia obtained from forward premia (left lower panel, panel C) using 
Eonia discounting. Premia on the right upper panel (panel B) are spot premia obtained by 
discounting forward premia using the Euribor yield curve. There is an unique ATM implied volatility 
surface (right lower panel, panel D), consistent with multiple-curve CSA discounting methodology . 
(Source: ICAP). 
 
3.5. Market Practice and P&L Impacts 
Up to the end of 2010, just a few banks and clearing houses have declared full adoption of CSA 
discounting also for balance sheet revaluation and collateral margination (see e.g. Bianchetti 
2012). On 17 June 2010 LCH.Clearnet communicated that its clearing platform SwapClear 
switched to OIS discounting for its $218 trillion Interest Rate Swap portfolio, in line with the new 
market practice for collateralized trades (Whittall 2010). The ISDA Margin Survey 2012 reports 
information regarding the diffusion of OIS and CSA discounting. ISDA distinguishes between OIS 
discounting, based on the use of an OIS yield curve for discounting purposes, and CSA 
discounting, based on the intent of reflecting implied economic terms within the deal valuation 
process. Data reported in Table 3 represent the percentage of 12 respondents that affirm to price 
at least a subset of OTC derivatives for margin purposes adopting OIS or CSA discounting. 
 
  OIS Discounting CSA Discounting 
Commodity Derivatives 16.6% 25.0% 
Credit Derivatives 33.3% 33.3% 
Equity Derivatives 25.0% 33.3% 
Fixed Income Derivatives 58.3% 50.0% 
FX Derivatives 16.6% 33.3% 
Table 3: percentage of 12 respondents to the ISDA Margin Survey 2012 pricing at least some OTC 
derivatives using OIS or CSA discounting (source: ISDA 2012). 
 
A B
Option Expiry 1Y 2Y 3Y 4Y 5Y 6Y 7Y 8Y 9Y 10Y 15Y 20Y 25Y 30Y Option Expiry 1Y 2Y 3Y 4Y 5Y 6Y 7Y 8Y 9Y 10Y 15Y 20Y 25Y 30Y
1M Opt 12 24.5 39 56 73.5 92 112 133 154 177 271 362 445 523 1M Opt 12 25 39 56 74 92 112 132 154 177 270 361 444 523
2M Opt 16.5 34.5 56 78.5 106 132 161 189 218 249 379 510 627 734 2M Opt 16 34 56 78 105 132 161 188 217 248 378 509 626 733
3M Opt 19.5 43 69 100 131 163 198 233 271 310 461 613 753 876 3M Opt 20 43 69 100 131 163 197 233 270 308 460 611 751 874
6M Opt 27.5 60 98 143 192 240 287 335 385 435 639 833 1026 1205 6M Opt 27 59 97 142 192 239 286 334 384 433 637 830 1023 1201
9M Opt 33 75 120 174 239 297 355 415 476 533 771 997 1219 1431 9M Opt 33 74 120 173 238 295 354 414 473 529 766 991 1214 1424
1Y Opt 39 86.5 143 210 282 349 418 486 555 620 892 1157 1409 1643 1Y Opt 39 86 142 209 281 347 416 484 553 618 888 1150 1403 1635
18M Opt 52 115 187 273 359 441 523 604 684 762 1084 1393 1687 1974 18M Opt 52 114 186 272 357 438 520 600 679 757 1077 1383 1676 1959
2Y Opt 71 150 240 335 433 523 612 701 788 877 1247 1594 1925 2247 2Y Opt 70 149 238 333 430 519 607 695 781 869 1236 1578 1908 2224
3Y Opt 106.5 215 326 439 554 659 762 864 963 1064 1494 1902 2297 2674 3Y Opt 106 213 323 434 547 651 753 853 950 1049 1474 1875 2266 2633
4Y Opt 132.5 260 387 515 640 758 874 986 1095 1203 1670 2119 2554 2965 4Y Opt 132 257 381 507 630 745 859 969 1075 1181 1639 2078 2507 2903
5Y Opt 150 292 429 566 700 829 954 1076 1195 1308 1796 2264 2723 3153 5Y Opt 148 286 420 553 684 810 932 1051 1168 1279 1753 2212 2659 3079
7Y Opt 169 327 476 624 771 912 1051 1186 1320 1450 1958 2437 2905 3351 7Y Opt 166 317 462 606 747 883 1019 1151 1280 1406 1896 2361 2811 3238
10Y Opt 176.5 347 506 661 815 967 1117 1265 1409 1549 2071 2554 3008 3429 10Y Opt 172 333 485 635 783 930 1074 1215 1352 1486 1987 2450 2885 3288
15Y Opt 175 346 508 669 825 977 1127 1276 1421 1571 2075 2537 2926 3312 15Y Opt 171 328 481 631 778 922 1064 1205 1342 1486 1963 2399 2768 3132
20Y Opt 169.5 335 496 652 805 955 1102 1246 1387 1523 2013 2426 2816 3161 20Y Opt 162 313 464 611 756 899 1036 1172 1303 1429 1887 2275 2639 2963
25Y Opt 162 321 477 625 771 915 1057 1197 1335 1475 1931 2310 2683 2999 25Y Opt 156 300 445 581 716 847 973 1099 1222 1369 1793 2144 2492 2786
30Y Opt 157.5 309 455 595 732 868 1003 1137 1273 1416 1847 2213 2562 2888 30Y Opt 151 277 406 531 673 781 910 1038 1168 1304 1701 2038 2360 2659
C D
Option Expiry 1Y 2Y 3Y 4Y 5Y 6Y 7Y 8Y 9Y 10Y 15Y 20Y 25Y 30Y Option Expiry 1Y 2Y 3Y 4Y 5Y 6Y 7Y 8Y 9Y 10Y 15Y 20Y 25Y 30Y
1M Opt 12 24.5 39 56 73.5 92 112 133 154 177 271 362 445 523 1M Opt 92.6 65.3 63.9 61.8 57.9 54.7 53 51.9 51.4 51.2 48.6 50.7 52.9 54.9
2M Opt 16.5 34.5 56 78.5 106 132 161 189 218 249 380 510 628 734 2M Opt 89.9 63.3 63.2 59.2 56.6 53.6 52 50.5 49.7 49.4 46.9 49.3 51.4 53.2
3M Opt 19.5 43 69 100 131 164 198 234 271 310 461 613 753 877 3M Opt 89.8 64.4 62.8 60.7 56.5 53.4 51.5 50.5 49.9 49.7 46.3 48.1 50.2 51.7
6M Opt 27.5 60 98.5 143 192 240 288 336 386 435 640 834 1027 1206 6M Opt 88.4 62.3 61.1 58.7 56.4 53.7 51.7 50.2 49.3 48.6 45.1 46.3 48.5 50.4
9M Opt 33 75 121 175 239 297 356 416 477 534 772 999 1221 1434 9M Opt 85.9 61.8 58.9 56.2 55.1 52.6 50.9 49.8 48.9 47.9 44.2 45.2 47.1 48.9
1Y Opt 39 86.5 143 211 283 350 419 487 557 622 894 1159 1412 1647 1Y Opt 84.4 59.4 57.7 55.9 54.2 51.9 50.4 49.2 48.4 47.4 44 45.2 47 48.6
18M Opt 52.5 115 188 274 360 442 525 606 687 765 1088 1398 1693 1981 18M Opt 80.8 58.2 55.2 53.9 52.1 50.2 48.8 47.6 46.7 45.9 43 44.2 45.9 47.5
2Y Opt 71 151 241 337 435 526 615 704 792 882 1254 1602 1935 2258 2Y Opt 81.5 58.9 55.1 52.4 50.7 48.6 47 45.8 44.8 44.2 42.3 43.5 45.2 46.8
3Y Opt 107.5 217 329 443 560 666 770 873 973 1074 1509 1921 2319 2700 3Y Opt 72.6 54.8 50.6 48.3 47 45.2 43.9 42.8 41.9 41.5 40.6 42.1 44 45.4
4Y Opt 135 265 394 525 652 772 890 1004 1115 1224 1701 2157 2601 3019 4Y Opt 58.5 48.1 45.7 44.4 43.2 41.9 41 40.1 39.5 39.3 39.1 40.7 42.6 43.8
5Y Opt 154.5 301 443 583 721 854 983 1109 1231 1349 1851 2334 2806 3250 5Y Opt 50 44 42.3 41.1 40.2 39.4 38.7 38.2 38 37.9 38 39.5 41.3 42.3
7Y Opt 180 348 507 665 821 971 1119 1263 1405 1544 2086 2595 3094 3569 7Y Opt 42.5 38.8 37.4 36.6 36.1 35.8 35.8 35.9 36.2 36.6 36.9 38 39.2 39.6
10Y Opt 200 392 573 748 922 1094 1264 1431 1594 1753 2343 2889 3404 3880 10Y Opt 35.1 33.6 33.2 33.2 33.6 34.1 34.9 35.7 36.5 37.1 37.1 37.6 37.6 37.1
15Y Opt 221 437 641 844 1041 1234 1424 1611 1794 1983 2620 3203 3695 4182 15Y Opt 37 37.2 37.9 38.8 39.6 40.2 40.8 41.3 41.8 42.6 40.3 38.2 35.7 34.6
20Y Opt 234 463 684 900 1111 1318 1521 1720 1915 2102 2778 3348 3885 4362 20Y Opt 44.9 43.8 43.9 44.1 44.4 44.9 45.4 45.7 45.9 45.7 39.6 35.1 33.1 31.7
25Y Opt 241 478 710 932 1149 1363 1574 1783 1988 2197 2875 3440 3997 4467 25Y Opt 49.1 48.1 48.3 47.6 46.7 45.7 44.6 43.6 42.7 43 35 31.4 29.8 28.6
30Y Opt 251.5 494 727 951 1169 1386 1602 1816 2033 2262 2950 3534 4091 4612 30Y Opt 45.7 40.2 38.6 37.2 37.6 35.5 35.1 34.8 34.8 35.1 30.5 28 26.8 26.3
Sw ap Tenor Sw ap Tenor
Sw ap Tenor Sw ap Tenor
31/05/2012 - EUR ATM Swaption Straddles - Fwd Premium Mids 31/05/2012 - EUR ATM Swaption Straddles - Implied Volatilities
31/05/2012 - EUR ATM Swaption Straddles - Implied Spot Premium Mids 31/05/2012 - EUR ATM Swaption Straddles - Implied Spot Premium Mids (Euribor disc)
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The embracing of the CSA discounting can determine relevant balance sheet impacts when a 
financial institution is re-valuing its portfolio considering the funding implications embedded in the 
collateral agreement. During the year 2010 some banks reported the NPV variations experienced 
on their OTC derivatives portfolios due to the adoption of the CSA discounting methodology. For 
example, BNP Paribas has declared € 108 mln loss on its IRS portfolio, instead Morgan Stanley 
has stated $ 176 mln gain from its IRD positions, Credit Agricole has accounted a negative 
variation on its Fixed Income portfolio of € 120 mln, while Royal Bank of Scotland and UBS has 
communicated a profit of £ 127 mln and CHF 76 mln respectively (see Cameron 2011 for further 
details). Clearly, the size and the direction of the P&L impacts are strongly influenced by the 
composition and the structure of the portfolio involved in the revision of the discounting 
methodology (Cameron 2011). 
 
3.6. Issues of CSA Discounting 
Switching financial institutions to CSA discounting in practice is not an easy task at all because of a 
variety of issues, that we discuss in the subsections below. 
3.6.1. Collateral and Liquidity Issues  
Besides the Evidence of CSA discounting from collateral management may be controversial. 
Collateral margination is usually managed by collateral desks at portfolio level for each 
counterparty under CSA, and not at trade level, thus hiding the discounting effects. On the other 
hand, in case of disputation pricing details on single or few trades are shared between the two 
counterparties in order to match the mark to market, thus allowing much more market intelligence 
than usual. Complications may arise because of the typical variety of clauses and details of 
collateral agreements, such as haircuts, margination frequency, rate spreads, currency, one-way 
margination, etc. that require, in principle, more sophisticated and CSA dependent pricing 
methodologies. Another bias may be introduced by opportunistic counterparties posting or asking 
collateral using their most convenient discounting methodology. The ISDA Standard CSA 
discussed in section 3.3 addresses and simplifies these issues.  
A very important challenge is the front-to-back integration of Banks’ internal credit and funding 
management, from trading to treasury, collateral and back office, in order to benefit of centralised 
credit and liquidity charges at single trade level. Such a re-organisation of traditionally separated 
areas may result to be very difficult, in particular for global international banking groups 
characterised by multiple subsidiaries and locations. In particular, the yield curves used for pricing 
internal deals (trades between different legal entities inside the banking group) reflects the cost of 
internal funding within the group, and has to do with the transfer pricing policy and business model 
of the Bank.  
3.6.2. Accounting Issues  
Since the International Accounting Standards (IAS), issued by the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB), stating that “in determining the valuation of OTC derivative […] a 
valuation technique (a) incorporates all factors that market participants would consider in setting a 
price and (b) is consistent with accepted economic methodologies for pricing financial instruments” 
(AG76), there exist a judgemental area, where the estimation of fair value is based on market 
(multilateral) consensus. CSA discounting is a typical case of evolving market consensus regarding 
the nature of CSA, from a simple accessory legal guarantee to a determinant of the fair value.  
Hedge accounting, in particular, is an accountancy practice allowed by IAS to mitigate the Profit & 
Loss volatility due to derivatives used for hedging. A typical situation arises when the interest rate 
risk of a liability (a bond issued by the bank, for instance) is hedged using a Swap. Hedge 
accounting requires that the profit & loss of the package (Bond + Swap) remains confined in the 
80%-125% window with respect to the initial fair value. The pricing of the package is based on ad 
hoc methodology (e.g. the liability cash flows are discounted using the floating rate of the Swap, for 
instance), that may partially accounts for the basis risk existing between the liability and the 
M. Bianchetti, M. Carlicchi Markets Evolution After The Credit Crunch 
 
 
Page 30 of 35 
derivative. As a consequence the adoption of CSA discounting may realize the basis risk, resulting 
in significant NPV jumps and even breaches of the hedge accounting 80-125 constrain. Hence, 
either the methodology must be revised to account for the basis risk, or hedges must be 
renegotiated.  
In order to converge with the principles issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) prescribed by the FAS157 (FASB 2006), the IASB has issued a new International Financial 
Reporting Standard (IFRS), in force since January 2013. According to the IFRS13, “the fair value is 
defined as the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an 
orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date” (IASB 2012).  
The determination of the fair value is, hence, a market-based measurement, not an entity-specific 
measurement. When measuring fair value, an entity uses the assumptions that market participants 
would use when pricing the asset or liability under current market conditions, including 
assumptions about risk. As a result, an entity’s intention to hold an asset or to settle or otherwise 
fulfil a liability is not relevant when measuring fair value. It is an exit price at the measurement date 
from the perspective of a market participant that holds the asset or owes the liability. In the case of 
OTC collateralized deals, the fair value of the contract must consider the effect of collateralization 
and, thus, it has to be consistent with the adoption of the CSA discounting approach. Moreover, the 
IFRS13, as the FAS157, allows to include in the fair value of an asset or liability the adjustments 
related both to the counterparty’s credit risk and to the entity’s own credit risk (Credit/Debit 
Valuation Adjustment, CVA/DVA, respectively). 
Responding to the market evolution and facing with industry needs, the FASB considers to 
introduce the use of the federal funds rate as the benchmark rate in the fair value determination of 
collateralized trades in US dollars (Madigan 2012). 
3.6.3. IT Issues  
The adoption of CSA-discounting is a big issue from an IT point of view that requires huge 
resources to be properly addressed. Here are some critical points.  
 Booking of trades in pricing systems must be reviewed, such that the information regarding 
the associated collateral is recovered.  
 Multiple yield curves and volatilities bootstrapping must be properly and consistently 
configured across all pricing systems.  
 Pricing systems configurations must be reviewed for CSA compliance, allowing proper 
assignments to each trade of different yield curves depending on the CSA. Hidden 
assumptions regarding discounting, e.g. default assignments of yield curve usage without 
explicit flags must be carefully avoided. 
 Risk computations and systems must be  reviewed as well, to capture the effects of the 
larger set of risk factors implied by multiple-curve CSA discounting methodology. 
 Commercial systems require new releases able to manage CSA discounting. Vendors must 
be typically fed with appropriate specs and the new releases carefully tested.  
 Proprietary systems and financial libraries must be reviewed and re-engineered to make 
them multiple-curve compliant. Previous poor library design is likely to require much more 
re-implementation effort.  
 Systems integration and alignment must be carefully checked to avoid the classical “two 
systems two prices” problem.  
In general, we can say that the switch to CSA discounting is a stress test for the IT architecture of 
a bank. The most complex or confused IT situations typically imply much more effort to switch, and 
vice versa. 
3.6.4. Risk Management Issues  
The adoption of CSA-discounting is a big issue also from a risk management point of view. We 
discuss each kind of risk in the points below. 
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 Model risk: this source of risk has to do with the modelling choices adopted for pricing 
trades and computing the corresponding risk measures. From this point of view, model risk 
is a primary source of risk underlying all the classical risk management areas discussed 
below (market risk, credit risk, etc.). The first and most important model risk in CSA 
discounting is to rely on the classical framework for pricing derivatives, in particular in 
presence of large basis expositions. In particular the market standard for uncollateralised 
trades is still under development for what regards the inclusion of the funding spread, 
leading to a so-called Funding Valuation Adjustment (FVA, see e.g. Carver 2012).  
A second source of model risk may be hidden into the clauses of collateral agreements, 
such as multiple eligible collateral assets and currencies, initial margin, close outs, etc. 
Once these details are included in the pricing methodology, important NPV jumps may 
appear, depending on the exposure of the bank with respect to it’s market counterparties. 
Finally, another source of model risk are the modern multiple-curve pricing models. Even if 
these models may be able to give a better description of the basis risk, they are, to date, 
still under development, and there is neither market standard nor quotations available for 
complete calibration, such as OIS options and volatilities. 
 Market risk: the most important source of market risk involved in CSA discounting is the 
basis risk in the multiple-curve world, in which even plain vanilla interest rate derivatives 
(e.g. Swaps) display complex delta sensitivities and exposures distributed across multiple 
Libors with different tenors and OIS rates. This kind of risk may be not fully captured or 
represented in standard, old style pricing and risk management frameworks grounded on 
Libor discounting. Basis risk is also expensive to hedge, requiring market Swaps, OIS and 
Basis Swaps. Furthermore, hedging the basis risk volatility would require options on the 
basis, not presently quoted in the market. In practice, basis risk is often hedged by proxy, 
using standard Libor Swaps and the most liquid Basis Swaps, thus leaving an open 
exposure to the Libor-OIS basis. The latter may be huge (Figure 7) and volatile (Figure 1). 
The corresponding (un)expected profit & loss is typically realized in case of unwindings or 
in case of adoption of CSA discounting, for instance when trades are migrated to Central 
Counterparties.  
 Credit and counterparty risk: this source of risk is captured in CSA discounting in the 
sense that, for trades under CSA, the collateral reduces the counterparty risk and the CSA 
discounting ensures no-arbitrage between the collateral rate and the discounting rate. A 
residual source of counterparty risk is left behind by re-hypothecation issues and by the 
mechanics of margination (see Brigo et al. 2011). In case of absence of CSA, Credit Value 
Adjustment (CVA) and Debt Value Adjustment (DVA) must be calculated, according with 
the funding component (FVA). We stress that a consistent treatment of DVA and FVA is an 
open topic still under investigation (see e.g. Morini and Prampolini 2011, Fries 2010, Carver 
2012).  
 Liquidity and funding risk: with liquidity and funding risk we mean the risk induced by the 
volatility of market funding rates. Funding liquidity risk management under CSA discounting 
is complicated by the fact that derivatives have a funding impact that depends on the CSA. 
The situation for uncollateralised trades is even more complex, because of the unclear 
funding component of the fair value (FVA) and of the uncertain and complex nature of the 
funding curve, depending on the prevailing market funding channels of the bank. In any 
case, a centralised liquidity management, integrating treasury, collateral management and 
sales/trading desks, would allow both a full view of all the expected cash flows generated 
by the bank’s activity by derivatives in particular, and a correct pricing of funding costs at 
single trade level.  
 Operational risk: the main source of operational risk (the risk of loss resulting from failed 
internal processes, people, systems, or external events) generated by CSA discounting is 
related to the increasing complication of pricing systems and liquidity management 
discussed above. A typical example may be a wrong assignment between a deal or a group 
of deals and their CSA, resulting in a wrong pricing. An unexpected Profit & Loss is 
revealed when the mistake is fixed.  
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We conclude with the observation that the main driver of the switch to CSA discounting is the 
evolution of pricing and risk methodologies, under the pressure of market evolution after the credit 
crunch. This a typical situation in which a solid Risk Management with strong quantitative 
resources may serve both as the traditional defence against unexpected losses, and as the pivot of 
the innovation. 
3.6.5. Management Issues  
Management is called to lead the change, and the corresponding frictions, taking business 
opportunities and controlling risks and costs. The main management decisions required for 
switching to CSA-discounting, as discussed in the points above, regard:  
 timing: when to switch  
 how to switch: all together or piecewise, depending on currency, asset classes, desks, 
subsidiaries, time-zone, main trading markets, etc.  
 a clear view about the multiple funding sources of the Bank (the funding curve) and re-
organisation for centralised credit and liquidity management  
 review and cleaning of collateral agreements with counterparties  
 how to manage the basis risk and the Profit & Loss generated by the switch  
 how to manage the hedge accounting  
 IT upgrade: booking, pricing, reporting, etc.  
 communication and explanation of the switch to markets, customers, auditors and 
regulators.  
3.6.6. The Role of Quants  
It is clear from the discussion above that CSA discounting is a typical complex problem in which a 
simple no-arbitrage pricing issue (choosing the correct discounting curve) generates many 
consequences that propagate all around in the market and inside the banks. In such a situation 
quant people have the responsibility of extending the modern no-arbitrage pricing framework into 
other areas of the bank, traditionally not familiar with pricing issues, in order to reach a better fair 
value and risk management at Bank’s level. Citing the conclusion of the KPMG survey (KPMG 
2011), “CSA or funding related valuation is not a pure playground for quants, but rather a topic that 
evokes questions about transfer pricing, steering of risk, and, most importantly, the business model 
of each bank.” 
 
4. Conclusions 
In this work we have presented a qualitative analysis of the markets evolution after the begun of 
the financial crisis in 2007. In particular, we have focused on the fixed income market and we have  
reported the most relevant empirical evidences regarding the divergences between the Euribor and 
Eonia OIS rates, between FRA and forward rates and the explosion of Basis Swap spreads. These 
market frictions have induced a segmentation of the interest rate market into sub-areas, 
corresponding to instruments with risky underlying Euribor rates distinct by tenors, and almost risk 
free overnight rates, characterized, in principle, by different internal dynamics reflecting different 
credit and liquidity risks.  
In response to the crisis, the classical pricing framework, based on a single yield curve used to 
calculate forward rates and discount factors, has been abandoned, and a new modern pricing 
approach has prevailed among practitioners, taking into account the market segmentation as an 
empirical evidence and incorporating the new interest rate dynamics into a multiple curve 
framework. We have shown market evidences of the diffusion and of the mechanism of collateral 
agreements among interbank dealers since the beginning of the financial crisis. Next, we have 
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introduced the multiple curve pricing framework, called CSA discounting, in the evaluation of 
collateralized contracts, showing that under no-arbitrage and self-financing assumptions the 
discounting curve must reflects the funding rate of the contract, that, in the case of collateralized 
OTC derivatives, usually coincides with the relevant O/N interest rate (i.e. Eonia for the EUR 
market). Consequently, we have reported evidences of the market transition to the modern CSA 
discounting pricing approach, and discussed the most relevant issues that a financial institution 
has to consider. 
Across all the paper, we argument that the roots of the numerous and complex changes 
encountered on the market in these years can be found in the different credit and liquidity risk 
perception of the interbank market participants, that can no longer consider themselves as “too big 
to fail”. We also believe that such risks and the corresponding consequences, such as the Libor-
OIS basis, will not return negligible as in the pre-crisis world, and will be there in future, exactly as 
the volatility smile has been there since the 1987 market crash.  
Expected further developments will regard, for example, the investigation of the relevant risk 
factors reflected in Libor rates (see e.g. Filipovic and Trolle 2012) and the pricing of non-
collateralized derivatives considering the bilateral default risk of the counterparties in terms of 
Credit Value Adjustment (CVA) and Debt Value Adjustment (DVA) and liquidity risk in the form of 
Funding Value Adjustment (FVA) (see Morini and Prampolini 2011). 
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